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At the beginning of Metaphysics Γ Aristotle claims that there is a science which is 
concerned with being qua being. Being’ is said in many senses. Different beings are not 
said to be purely homonymous, but rather to be “related to one thing (πρόσ iv)”(1003a33- 
4). G.E.L Owen translates this ττρός ευ formula as "focal meaning", and in his paraphrase, 
it means that all the “senses [of ‘being’] have one focus, one common element”, or “a 
central sense”, so that “all its senses can be explained in term s o f substance and o f the 
sense of ‘being’ that is appropriate to substance.” According to Owen, “focal meaning” is 
new and revolutionary in Meta.T, and introduces a “new treatment of to on and other 
cognate expressions”, which consists mainly in the following two thesis:
(1) The “focal meaning” idea contradicts and replaces Aristotle’s earlier view in 
the Organon, EE and others that beings differ in different categories, and ‘being’ 
has various distinct senses.
(2) The “focal meaning” idea makes it possible for Aristotle to establish a 
universal science of being qua being in Meta. Γ, which contradicts and replaces 
his earlier view that because beings differ, a universal science o f being is
\ Ύimpossible.
The influence o f Owen’s interpretation on Aristotelian scholarship cannot be exaggerated. 
The notion o f the “focal meaning” has been widely adopted as a technical term and 
Owen’s above two theses continue to be embraced in their fundam entals.1 23
1 G.E.L.Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in some earlier Wortes o f Aristotle”, in Aristotle and Plato 
in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. I. During and G.E.L.Owen, Goteborg, 1960, 163-90. The quotations 
are from pp. 168-9, p.189. The position is further explained in Owen’s “Aristotle on the Snares of 
Ontology”, in .Yew Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1965, 69-75), and “The Platonism of Aristotle”, Proceedings o f the British Academy 
51 (1966), 125-50. All these papers are colleted in Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic, ed. Martha 
Nussbaum, Duckworth, 1986.
2Owen, 1960, 168-9,189.
3W.Leszl provides a lengthy criticism of Owen’s interpretation in Logic and Metaphysics in 
Aristotle, Padua, 1970), but his work seems largely ignored. The general sentiment towards Owen’s 
position is well summarised in M.T. Ferejohn’s remarks that its truth is “put beyond serious dispute 
by the relatively plain structure of Metaphysics Γ2” (“Aristotle cm Focal Meaning and the Unity of 
Science”, Phronesis, 25 (2), 1980,117). In his recent laudable book, D. Bostock proposes that when 
Aristotle in Z1 claims that being belongs primarily and in the simple way to substance, he changes
2In this paper, I try to provide an alternative account o f the πρός εν, which shows 
that the προς εν of being in Meta. Γ2 is neither new nor revolutionary. Consequently, I 
will reject, respectfully, both claims made by Owen
I. Being is said π ο λ λ α χ ώ ς  
So far as ‘being’ is concerned, Owen takes A ristotle’s notion o f signification 
(verb, σημαίνειν, “to signify) to mean “sense” or “meaning”.4 Following this usage, to 
say that a word has a sense is to say that it has a distinct significatum. ‘Being’ has many 
significata and is thus said in many senses. Being in Aristotle, as is well-known, can 
either be the word that is signifying or the things signified. In modem language analysis it 
is thought that it must be the word ‘being’ that could have a “sense” or ‘Toca! meaning”, 
although Aristotle is dealing more often with the extra-linguistic entity, the significatum 
more than the word.
‘Being’ has many significata. Corresponding to each o f these, there is a signifying 
category. The categories “signify” (Cof.4,lb26), and what they signify are “things that 
are” (ta onto la20, cf. Topics, 1.9, 103b27). When Aristotle lists “substance”, “quality”, 
“quantity”, “relation”, and so on, it is often not clear whether he is talking about them as 
signifying categories, or as the signified extra-linguistic beings.5 It is on the conception of 
signification that Aristotle affirms that there are as many beings as there are categories 
(Meta Δ 7 ,1017a 23-28). Indeed, the multivocity of being and the theory o f categories are 
so closely associated that A ristotle simply calls substance, quality, quantify, etc. 
“categories of being”.6 Accordingly, the study of categories is therefore the study of 
beings. If we can determine how categories differ, we know how beings differ.
his earlier view that there are as many ultimately different beings as there are categories. The 
change is mainly based on die priority in definition: “now [in Meta. Z l] he [Aristotle] has come to 
the view that there is after all a common element in all definitions, namely substance, and this 
notably alters the position” (Aristotle ’s Metaphysics, Books Z and H, Oxford, 1994,67). Clearly this 
is in line with Owen.
4 Owen, ibid 1965, 73. Etymologically, σημαίνειν is related to the modem word “semantics”. Not 
surprisingly, it has been a matter of dispute how to understand Aristotle’s conception of 
signification. While Owen’s understanding (held also by J.Bames (tr.and ed.) Aristotle: Posterior 
Analytics, Oxford, 1975,205) tends to be intensional, Ferejohn believes that it is extensional (ibid. 
1980,118). C. Kirwan suggests that “to signify” can be either “to mean”, or “to denote” in different 
texts (Aristotle Metaphysics, Books Γ, A  and E, Oxford, Second edition, 1993. 94). Yet 
D.W.Hamlyn claims that Aristotle does not have a distinction between sense and reference ( “Focal 
Meaning”, Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society, 78 (1977-8),1- 18.1977-8, 12). For Aristotle, 
signifiers includes not only name, but also verbs, phrases and sentences (Poetics, 1456b38ff ). For a 
detailed discussion of this issue, cf. T.H. Irwin, “Aristotle’s Concept of Signification”, in Language 
and Logos, eds. M.Schofield and M.C. Nussbaum, Cambridge, 1982, 241-66). He concludes that 
Aristotle’s use is unsystematic.
5 As J.LAckrill remarks, “It is careless of him to speak as if it were substances (and not names of 
substances) that signify” ( Ackrill (tr.and ed.), Categoires and De Interpretatione, Oxford 1963, 
88).
6 ai κατηγορίαι του ôvroç, Meta.§\, b28.
3We are therefore led to the two texts in the corpus which provide Aristotle’s full 
ten member list o f categories: Cat A , and Topics I, 9. ’Usually these two texts are viewed 
as presenting different procedures for reaching the same list. In both places, categories are 
thought to result from different answers to the Socratic “what is it?” question, and the 
main difference is that in Cat. 4 different questions are asked about a single thing, while 
in Topics 1.9 a single question is asked about different things.7 8 I would like to propose 
that these two texts are related in a different and philosophically more significant way. 
Whereas Topics 1.9. provides a procedure to explain how  categories differ. Cat. 4 displays 
the structural relationship of these distinct categories. Furthermore, Cat. 4 must be based 
on Topics 1.9. To see this, let us begin with an analysis o f Topics 1.9, and then proceed to 
compare it with Cat A.
In the Topics scheme, the procedure for arriving at the list o f categories goes like 
this: First, one points to different things, asks what each o f them is and obtains an answer 
to these questions. For instance, if  we point to a person, say, Socrates, and ask what the 
thing is, the answer is “This is Socrates”; if  one points to a white color, the answer to the 
question is “This is white”.
Then the second step is: “each o f these kinds o f predicates, if  either it be asserted 
of itself, or its genus be asserted of it, signifies what something is (τ ί έστι, 103b36-38)”. 
This second step shows that once we have an ostensive statement, a hierarchy of 
predicates will follow. In the sentence “This is Socrates”, the predicate “Socrates” is 
asserted of the subject Socrates. Yet this predicate can in turn be a subject and is 
predicated by its species word and genus word (e.g. “Socrates is a man” and “A man is an 
animal”). In this process, the predicate o f the lower level predication becomes the subject 
o f the higher level, and the predicates become more and more broad. The hierarchy ends 
if  it reaches an ultim ate predicate which does not fall under any other. If the series starts 
with “Socrates”, the ultimate predicate is “Substance”; if it starts with “white”, the 
ultimate predicate is “quality”; and so on. These ultimate predicates o f each of these 
hierarchies o f predication are categories. Each o f them  signifies a being.
Within each hierarchy of predication, the subject o f predication and the objects 
predicated are items o f the same nature. In “Socrates is a man”, both “Socrates” and 
“man” share the same kind o f nature. Bn “White is a color”, both “white” and “color” are 
items of the same nature. Each of them  therefore forms a genus-species-particular 
structure. In contrast, “Socrates” and “white” are clearly entities o f a different nature, and 
cannot form a genus-species relation, and they cannot be in the same hierarchy of 
predication. Thus, the different nature o f  these hierarchies o f predication determines a 
category’s classificatory function, that is, catégorial difference. I hereafter refer to this 
type of predication, in which both subject-expression and predicate-expression are items 
in the same category, as the “same-category predication” (for brevity, SCP).
Seen in this way, categories are different from each other because each has 
underneath it a  different hierarchy o f SCP. For ten categories, there are ten different 
“forms” of SCP, and each category is the ultimate predicate o f one type o f SCP. The
7 In other places, the number is usually reduced, or the list is open-ended in the form of “so on”, or 
‘the rest”, cf. e.g. Meta. Δ 7 ,1017a24-7; Z l, 28al 1-13.
8 Ackrill, ibid. 1963,79-80.
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generation of a category is related to the type or logical form o f predication. The 
difference between categories is determined by the types o f predication.
Such a reading o f Topics 1.9 connects this text with Meta. Δ7 where Aristotle
says:
All those that the figures o f predication (τά  σ χή μ α τα  της κ α τη γο ρ ία ς) signify 
are said to be in their own right (Καθ’ α ύ τά  δε είναι λ έγετα ι); for ‘to be’ 
signifies in the same number o f  ways as they are said. Since, therefore, among 
things predicated some signify what a thing is, some a qualification, some a 
quantity, some a relative, some doing or beings affected, some where, some when, 
‘to be’ signifies the same thing as each o f these.9 
This passage indeed establishes the correspondence between the figures o f predication, 
categories and beings.
Yet why is it the case that beings which are the significata o f categories are also 
signified by the figures o f predication? For Aristode, a name signifies, and a definition 
(λόγος) which explains the meaning o f the name signifies as well. Definition and name 
signify the same thing (Top. 92b26-34; Meta. 1030a7-9). Typically, a definition o f this 
type must be genus + differentiae (Top. 142b22-9; 143a29-bl0; 144a5-22). Topics 1.9 
shows that categories are the ultim ate predicates of different forms o f hierarchies o f SGP. 
Since in every SCP there is a particular-species (or genus) relation between subject and 
predication, each turns out precisely to be a genus + differentia definition which 
explicates the sense o f  each category member. For Aristotle, definition and name signify 
the same thing. So when he says here that beings are significata o f both categories and the 
figures o f predication, “the figures o f  predication” in this passage should be the same 
thing as the different forms o f SCP in Topics 1.9. Both o f them are essence-stating 
definitions of categories.10
Aristotle frequently says that “being is said ιτο λλ α χώ ς”. The word π ο λ λ α χώ ς, 
as is well-known, contains what M atthews calls a “sense-kind confusion”.11 The sentence 
can be translated as either (1) “being is said in many senses”, or (2) “being is said in many
9A/eto.l017a22-28: The translation is from Kirwan, ibid. 1993, with the first sentence modified. 
Kirwan’s translation is: “All things which signify the figures of predication are said to be in their 
own right”. The Greek allows both ways, yet it makes sense that beings in their own right should be 
what is signified instead of being signifying terms.
10Such a reading might shed some light on the long standing debate whether category should be 
“predication” or “predicate”. The Greek word “kategoricT, from which the word “category” 
originates, is from the verb kategorein (“to predicate”), and can be translated either as 
“predication”, or “predicate”. Whereas traditionally an Aristotelian category has been understood as 
a predicate, Frede argues that in its technical sense ¡categoría literally means “predication” or “kind 
of predication”, and in a derivative sense, it also means predicate (“Categories in Aristotle”, in his 
Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, 1987, 32-35. I tend to believe that the word is used by 
Aristotle both in the sense of predication (for various sensible textual evidence, see Frede, ibid. 
32ff.) and in the sense of predicates (i.e., when it refers to the single terms such as substance, 
quality, quantity, etc. These items are what the modem word ‘category’ refers to). Aristotle can use 
the weed in both ways, because only predication can explicate what predicate signifies, and they 
signify die same.
n G.B .Matthews, “Senses and Kinds”, Journal o f Philosophy® (1972), 149-157.
5lands”. These two translations lead to significantly different understandings. According to 
(1), ‘being’ has many distinct senses rather than one single sense or meaning, and is 
hence not a unified concept. To be a substance (e.g. “to be a man”) differs from being a 
quality (e.g. “to be white”) in what it is for them to be. According to (2), there is a single 
meaning or sense of being which is shared by many kinds o f being. In this case, to be a 
substance differs from being a quality because they are different kinds of the same being.
I would like to propose the we have to distinguish the different circumstances in 
which this phrase is used. When it applies to different categories, as it most often does,12 
it must mean that ‘being’ is said in many “senses”, since each being as a significatum o f a 
category is explicated by a distinct genus-differentia definition. The same word ‘being’ 
has a different meaning in each category. Hence Aristotle can certainly claim that there is 
no such genus as being that stands above all categories.13 There is no single general 
definition applicable to all catégorial beings.
The sam e sentence, however, can also apply to different members within the same 
category. In Meta. H 2 we read:
Clearly then the word ‘is’ is said in ju st as m any ττολλαχώ ζ; a thing is a 
threshold because it lies in such and such a position, and its being means its lying 
in that position, while being ice means having been solidified in such and such a 
way. And the being of some things will be defined by all these qualities 
.. ,(1042b26— 1043al 1).
Threshold is a member o f the category of substance, and so is ice. They have the same 
genus and are members o f  the same category. To define them by means of their location 
or special ways o f composition is to give their differentia- What distinguishes threshold 
from ice is not the nature o f being a substance, but the differentiae that mark off different 
kinds o f substance. Thus, the phrase “being is said π ο λ λ α χ ώ ς ” , applied within the 
same category, should be translated as “being is said in many kinds (or ways)”.
Π Cat. 4 and Topics 1.9 
Now let us proceed to the list o f categories in Cat. 4. It is usually thought that 
there is a single procedure here to generate the list o f categories, that is, to ask many 
questions about the same thing. The text itself, however, does not really present such a 
procedure. Instead Aristotle simply says: “To give a rough idea, examples of substance 
are man, horse; o f quantity: four-foot, five-foot; o f qualification: white, grammatical; o f a 
relative: double, half, larger; o f where: in the Lyceum, in the market place; ...”(2a3-6). It 
is from these examples that we can infer that he is asking many question about the same 
subject This same subject must be a member within the category of substance, such as a 
person, or a person-like entity. For only such a subject can at the same time possess 
attributions such as “grammatical”, “in the Lyceum”, “sitting”, and so forth. Expressed in 
the form o f predication “S is P”, the idea in Cat. 4 is that “S” must be an item o f 
substance, w hile “P” could be a member of any category. I would like to call this form o f 
predication the “substance-subject predication” (for abbreviation, SSP). SSP is clearly 
different from SCP which underlies the Topics 1.9. For in SCP, “S” can be a member o f
12 See Met. Γ2, and Z l, Physics, 185a21; DA, 410al3; EN, 1096a24.
13 Meta. 998b22-7. An.Po. 92bl4; S.E.172al4-5; ££.1217b35-6; £W.1096a23-7. Cf. also Meta 
K.1059Ö31.
6any category, not confined to substance, but “P ” must be the subject-expression’s own 
species or genus in the same category. Different predicates answer to different subjects in 
the same category, rather than to the same subject
SCP and SSP are not parallel regarding category-generation. SCP provides us 
with an understanding o f why categories differ, for categories are the ultim ate genera o f 
different forms of SCP. In contrast, SSP indicates that all predicates are related to one 
subject, but does not explain how and why these predicates are different as categories. No 
reason is offered here as to why a category can classify things. We lack in Cat. 4 a 
principle to justify what constitutes catégorial difference. In AtiPr. 49a6-8 Aristotle says 
that ‘“ this belongs to that’ “must be understood in as many senses as there are different 
categories”. Accordingly, some com m entators argue that since different forms o f SSP, 
such as “Socrates is white” and “Socrates is 5 feet tall”, can be paraphrased as “X belongs 
to some substance”, we must suppose that they introduce different catégorial 
relationships, and the items in each d ifférait category are differently related to the 
substances to which they belong.14 I find this interpretation unpersuasive. To say that “to 
belong to” has as many senses as categories, is not to say that “to belong to” causes 
catégorial difference. On the contrary, it seems that we have to first understand how 
categories differ before we understand why “belong to” in these predications have 
different senses. What SSP itse lf indicates is that different tilings are related to 
substances, not how these thing differ, let alone differ as categories.
I would like to propose that the Cat.4 passage is not intended to explain catégorial 
difference. It simply “gives a rough idea”, i.e., to list a few instances o f each o f these 
categories rather than explaining w hat each o f them is. In Cat. 2 Aristotle suggests that all 
things (that categories signify) can be divided into four kinds according to the ties o f 
“said o f’ and “being in”. Cat. 4 introduces SSP. Cat. 5 provides a detailed picture o f how 
different categories are related to the prim ary subject based on these two connecting ties. 
This context suggests that Cat. 4 is preparing the way for Cat. 5, and that SSP is to show 
how other categories are related to substance, rather than why each category counts as a 
category. It is the job o f the Topics 1.9 to specify catégorial difference, and the job is 
done by showing that the catégorial difference is based on the different forms o f 
predications. It seems to be the case that Aristotle first determines the types and numbers 
o f categories in the Topics 1.9, and then proposes that these categories are predicated of 
one and the same subject in Cat. 4. Cat. 4 m ust have presupposed the catégorial difference 
established in Topics 1.9.15
Furthermore, we should be able to  say that what is made explicit in SSP must have 
been implied in Topics 1.9. First, in the generation o f a category. Topics 1.9 says that we 
first point to different things such as a  person, a color, a relation, ask “what is it” for each 
of them, which then initiates each series o f  SCP up to the final genus. Yet it is clear that 
one cannot point to a color without being aware that it is something’s color, and cannot
14 Cf. Owen, ibid. 1965,82, nl4; Kirwan, ibid. 1993,2nd.ed., 142
15 As a matter of fact, Cat. 4 does not even mention the word “kategorki”. If Cat. 4 is taken alone, 
tire list might not be called a list of “categories”. The word, however, appears in other chapters 
(twice in ch.5, 3a35, 3a37; and twice in ch.8, 10bl9, 10b21.1 owe the reference to John Anton, 
“On the Meaning of Kategoria in Aristotle’s Categories”, in Aristotle ’s Ontology, eds. Anthony 
Preus and John P. Anton, State University o f New York Press, 1992X p.15.
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7point to a relation without being aware that it is a relation o f certain substances. It is 
unlikely that when A ristotle presents his case in Topics 1.9, he is not aware of the relation 
of non-substance categories to substance. What he is doing is to show what it is for each 
category to be, isolated in abstract analysis, and he leaves the job o f explaining how these 
categories are related to  substance to the Categories.
Second, in the Topics 1.9, Aristotle on the one hand claims that each category 
signifies a “what it is”  (τ ί έστι, ΤορΛ.9, 103b27-29) on the other, the first category, 
substance, is also called “what it is” (103b23, 27). Thus, “what it is” appears to have a 
broad ami a narrow use. The broad use applies to every category, and a narrow or restricted 
use applies only to substance and even serves as a label for substance. This certainly 
implies that substance has a privileged position among beings.
It is not difficult to see that SSP in Cat. is precisely the predication form o f the 
πρό$ εν structure, for it explains that substance is the common subject of all other things 
and therefore possesses a privileged position. In Meta. Z1 Aristotle claims that “being is 
said in many senses”, that is, substance, quality, quantity, and so on, but that which is 
primarily is the substance o f the thing”. The reason is that
All other things are said to be because they are, some o f them, quantities o f that 
which is in th is primary sense, others qualities o f it, others affections o f it, and 
others some other determinations o f it (1028al 3-20).
In other words, substance is the subject o f everything else. Substance is the underlying 
subject Expressed in predication, this picture is SSP.
Meta Γ illustrates the πρόζ εν formula as follows:
Some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are 
affections o f substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or 
destruction or privations or qualities o f substance, or productive or generative o f 
substance, or o f things which are relative to substance,....(1003b6-10).
Expressed in predication, the πρό$ εν is essentially also SSP.
In Γ2 when all other things are πρό$ εν, to substance, substance then becomes the 
primary sense o f all beings (003M7-8). In Z4, it is also explained that irpôç εν of being 
means that being is neither homonymous nor synonymous, and what it expresses is that 
“definition and essence in the primary and simple sense belong to substances. Still they 
belong to other things as well in a similar way, but not primarily” ( Meta. Z4, 1030M-6). The 
rank of primary and secondary senses (Meta. Z4, 1030a21-24) is, in my view, the same 
with the distinction between the broad and narrow uses o f “what it is”(7op.l.9 103b27-29; 
cf. also Meta. Z l, 1028al2-3). Hence, SSP, the primacy o f substance, and the ττρός εν are 
indeed different expressions standing for the same thing.
ΠΙ: The “focal meaning” o f Owen 
The picture which has emerged from our above discussion raises some grave 
difficulties to Owen’s “focal meaning” interpretation. First, if  the πρό$ εν structure o f 
being has been implied in the predication o f SSP which lies behind the list o f categories 
in Cat. 4, what A ristotle says in Γ says should be traceable to the Categories. Contrary to 
Owen, Aristotle in the earlier works o f the Cat. or the Topics also believe that different 
beings are connected. Second and more important, we have shown that SSP and πρόξ εν 
are identical, and SCP indicates that there are as many beings as there are categories.
8Owen’s developmental interpretation im plies that there is a  real tension between Topics. 
1.9 and Cat. 4; that is, between what SSP stands for and what SCP stands for. Since no 
tension exists between these two texts, Owen’s developmental picture seems foreign to 
Aristotle.
This leads us to examine the basis on which Owen establishes his arguments. 
When Owen claims that Γ 1-2’s introduction o f “focal meaning” involves a “new 
treatment o f being and its cognate expressions” and replaces Aristotle’s earlier view that 
beings differ, he has three arguments: (a) There is an earlier period in which Aristotle 
believes that being is homonymous; (b) The introduction o f  the Trpôç εν structure in Meta 
Γ is new, and (c) The Trpôç εν replaces the view that each being has a distinct sense.
Owen has two pieces o f evidence to justify· h is first position that being is 
homonymous in earlier Aristotle: A ristotle directly mentions being as an instance o f 
homonym at SE, 182b 13-27; and in the Topics, when a word is said in many senses, it is 
a case o f homonym.16 Neither o f these references, however, is conclusive. The contrast 
between the irpôç εν and homonym m ust be qualified. Aristotle appears to recognise that 
there are different sorts o f homonyms. He contrasts the trpôç εν with “complete” 
(ττάμιταν) or “chance” (cbç ετυχεν) homonym {EE 1236al8, b25-6; EN, 1096b26-8),17 
or “homonym, and in virtue o f nothing common” {Meta. 1060b33-4). There seems to be 
a distinction in Aristotle between a com plete homonym in which a word has many senses 
but with nothing common among them , and a non-complete one in which a word has 
many senses, but these senses are related. ‘Being’ can be a  homonym in the latter sense, 
and is hence not incompatible with the trpôç εν form ula.18 Moreover, it is equally 
inconclusive to say that multivocity is identical with homonym. As Irwin has pointed out, 
cm many occasions, “Aristotle im plies that things are multivocal but not 
homonymous. 19The alleged identity between multivocity and homonym is further 
undermined if  there are different kinds o f  homonym. If  a word has many senses, and there 
is no connection among them, it is an instance o f complete homonym. Yet a word can be 
said in many senses, with there being some sort o f connection among them. The 
multivocity o f ‘being’ is consistent w ith the latter case, but not the former case.
When Owen claims that the Trpôç εν is a new derice in Meta. Γ1-2, he is aware 
that he is challenged by various textual evidence. The rrpôç εν appeared in EE, 1236a7-
“Owen, ibid. 1960,167, n5.
17 In EN, it is άφ’ ένό$ instead of rrpôç εν but it has been thought that these two expressions are 
not generally distinguished (Owen, ibid 1960, 66, n.7. J. Owens, The Doctrine o f Being in 
Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto, 1963,117-8).
lsOwen is fully avare of die existence o f the différait usages o f homonym, but he dismisses it 
lightly by saying that “ Often he (Aristotle] takes no notice of this modification of homonym, 
treating homonym as die sole complement of synonymy where single expressions are concerned” 
(1965, 73, n.5). For a full defence of the position that there are two types of homonym in Aristotle, 
see Leszl, ibid. 1970, Parts iv-v, Irwin, “Homonymy in Aristotle”, Review o f Metaphysics, 1981, 
523-544 Irwin also believes that “focal meaning” is an instance of connected homonym. But 
surprisingly, he does not question Owen’s thesis that in his earlier period Aristotle recognised only 
that beings are unconnected.
19 Irwin, ibid.\9il, 529-30.
933, a work Owen believes to belong to the earlier stage. Although there it applies to 
“friendship”, the analysis o f the formula is the same with Meta. Z4, 1030a21-24 where it 
applies to being, “what it is”, essence, and definition. In both places the Trpôç εν is 
neither (strictly) homonymous, nor (strictly) synonymous, but rather it means that the 
primary sense o f the term belongs to the first instance.
Owen recognises that the Trpôç εν formula appears in EE, and he also concedes 
that it is even implied in some passages o f the Topics. However, regarding its presence in 
the Topics, he maintains that Aristotle does not “attach any importance to it”.20 Regarding 
the presence o f the irpôç εν structure in EE, he insists that Aristotle “has not seen its 
application to such wholly general expressions as ‘being’ or ‘good’”.21 But there is 
stronger evidence against Owen. For in the Categories, although the Trpôç εν does not 
apply directly to  the term  ‘being’, it applies to some catégorial beings, for instance, 
“quantity” at 5a38-bl0. Being frilly aware o f this fact, Owen still insists that this “focal 
meaning” is “not in  that logical ordering of different categories and different senses o f 
‘being’ which lies at the root o f the argument in M eta. IV”22. However, the Trpôç εν is 
used to establish the priority o f substance over other categories, and such a priority is 
demonstrated in Cat. 5. Again, Owen claims that “this priority was o f an older Academic 
vintage which did not involve focal meaning”.23 This is hardly convincing. As we will see 
shortly, the ground for establishing this priority in Cat. 5 is essentially the same as that in 
Meta. Z1 and Γ2.
Owen makes a strong claim that the idea o f “focal meaning” replaces Aristotle’s 
alleged earlier view o f being:
‘Being’ is an expression with focal meaning is a claim that statements about non­
substances can be reduced to—translated into-statements about substances; and it 
seems to be a corollary o f this theory that non-substances cannot have matter or 
form o f their own since they are no more than the logical shadows o f substance.24 
But his major argument for this is to insist that in his earlier period Aristotle does not 
recognise the existence o f Trpôç εν structure of being. Earlier we raised objections to this 
argument. Given the common understanding between Owen and us that for Aristotle “to 
mean” is “to signify”, it is unclear how the Trpôç εν o f being, which indicates that all 
others refer to substance, causes other beings to lose their own “matter and form” and to 
be reduced to the “logical shadow” o f substance. I f  a “sense” or “meaning” is associated 
with a significatum, the existence o f a “focal meaning” o f being would require that there 
is one common significatum of ‘being’. Yet in Meta. Z4, Aristotle says that to say a term 
has a irpôç εν structure excludes the case that it is about “one and the same thing” (ού το 
αυτό δε και εν). 1030Μ-2) and is not “καθ’ εν” (in accordance with one, 1030b4).
“ Owen, ibid. 1960, ,174
2IOwen, ibid. 1960,169
“ Owen, ibid. 1960,175
“ Owen, ibid. 1960, 178
24 Owen, ibid 1960,180.
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Although at one point, Owen claim s that in Meta, iv and vi Aristotle is “anxious to 
minimise the contrast between synonymy and focal meaning”,25 he generally makes it 
clear that “focal meaning” does not collapse into synonymy, or strict synonym. For Owen, 
“the simple dichotomy ‘univocal’ or ‘multivocal, synonymous or homonymous’ is not 
sophisticated enough to catch such a w ord” and so “focal meaning” is indeed “the tertium  
quiet'.26 Nevertheless, in Owen’s discussion, the precise difference between synonymy 
and this tertium quid is not quite clear, and what “focal meaning” is lacks a needed 
precision. Owen is aware of that but ascribes the ambiguity to Aristotle himself:
Aristotle has not solved the problem  o f defining focal meaning fully and exactly 
so as to give that idea all the philosophical power that he comes to claim for it: he 
has given only the necessary, no t the sufficient, conditions for its use. But there is 
no reason to think that this problem can have a general answer. Aristotle’s evasion 
of it may come from the conviction that any answer would be artificial, setting 
boundaries that must be endlessly too wide or too narrow for his changing 
purposes.27
IV  πρό$ εν
Although Γ2 is generally regarded as the locus o f the πρό$ εν formula, the 
chapter does not really do much other than illustrate that substance is the subject o f 
everything else by means of a comparison with the terms “health” and “medicine”. In 
general, Meta. Γ  2 leaves readers with the impression that it is a summary o f discussions 
carried out elsewhere. Since we have shown that SSP, the primacy o f being and the π ρος 
εν are different expressions o f the sam e thing (that is, substance is the subject o f 
everything else), we can expect a reasonable understanding o f these expressions by 
understanding how, and in what sense, substance is the subject o f everything else. The 
major texts that provide detailed arguments for this are Cat.5 and Meta. Z l. Both o f 
these texts have been intensively discussed in the literature. The following discussion will 
be confined to showing that when these texts argue for the primacy o f substance, they are 
not reducing the senses of other categories to substance. Let us start with Cat. 5.
In SSP, S refers to a substance member, and can be a substantial particular 
(primary substance), or substantial species or genus (secondary substance). When S is a 
primary substance, “P” includes both (a) secondary substances or substantial universals, 
such as “man”, and (b) non-substantial universals. When P is a substantial universal, SSP 
is indeed a type o f SCP.
When Aristotle says that both secondary substances and non-substantial universals 
are predicated o f primary substance, he makes it clear that these two kinds o f predicates 
have different natures. When secondary substances are predicated o f primary substance, 
both their names and their definitions can be predicated o f primary substance. We say 
“Socrates is a man”, and since “rational animal” is the definition o f “man”, we can also
25 Owen, 1960,185. Aristotle does say in one place that die πρός εν is “in a sense” (τρόπον τινα) 
synonymous” (MetaT 2, 1003bl4-15). One might think, as is the case with homonym, there is a 
distinction between a strict synonym and a loose sense of synonym. But the point is not developed 
by Aristotle. Ιη.Γ 2, 1003b 14-15 he seems to be talking in an analogical sense.
260wen, ibid. 1960, 179; ibid. 1966,146.
27 Owen, ibid. 1960,189.
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say “Socrates is a rational animal”. Such a predicate reveals what primary substance is, its 
essence. On the other hand, when the non-substantial universals are predicated of primary 
substance, only their names (more properly, their adjective forms) are predicated, but not 
their definitions. We can say “Socrates is white”, but we cannot say “Socrates is a kind of 
color”. Hence, in SSP, non-substantial predicates cannot explain what primary substance 
is and are therefore accidental predicates. “White” does not signify what “Socrates” is 
and so its definition cannot explicate this significatum. In contrast, secondary substances 
are essential predicates. The name “man” signifies what Socrates is, and its definition 
explicates this significatum, and so can apply to explaining what Socrates is. This 
distinction suggests that the definition of a non-substance category and the definition of 
substance are different. Since definition explains what a name signifies, Aristotle clearly 
implies that different categories have different significata.28
Cat. 5 presents the structure o f reality as follows: “All the other things are either 
said of the primary substances as subject or are in them as subjects” (Cat. 2bl4-5). That is 
the picture o f SSP, and the ontological implication o f it is that “If  the primary substances 
did not exist it would be impossible for any o f the other things to exist” (Ca/.2b5-6; 
cf.2bl5-17, 2b37-38). W hat is demonstrated here is the ontological asymmetry between 
substances and non-substance categories, that is, the significatum o f the category o f 
substance underlies the significata o f  other categories. Since Aristotle still claims that 
each non-substance category has its own definition, this ontological dependency does not 
amount to sense-reduction.
The ontological dependency o f other categories upon substance is argued in more 
detail in M eta Z l. Other categories, according to Z l, cannot exist independent of 
substance, because substance “underlies” them. The expression o f any non-substance 
category will always imply some reference to a substance (that is, SSP). To say that this is 
a quality implies that it is a quality o f some substance, yet to say that a substance is does 
not imply anything about other categories. Accordingly, “that which is primarily and is 
simply (not is something) m ust be substance” (1028a30-31 ).
Having claimed that substance is being in its primary sense on the basis of 
ontological priority, A ristotle further specifies that the primacy o f substance over other 
categories can be understood in three ways: natural priority, priority in definition, and 
priority in knowledge. Natural priority means that “o f the other categories none can exist 
separately, but only substance” (1028a34-35). Priority in definition—or what is usually 
called logical priority— means that die definition o f substance must be inherent 
(ένυπάρχειν) in the definitions o f other categories (1028a34-6). Priority in knowledge 
means that “we know each particular thing most truly when we know what ‘man’ or ‘fire’ 
is, rather than its qualify or quantify or position”.29
28 It must be noted, however, dial die distinction between an essential predicate and an accidental 
predicate is valid only insofar as SSP is concerned. Each SCP is in fact a case of essential 
predication in the sense that the predicate can be [Medicated of its same-category subject in both 
name and definition. But when Aristotle discusses the “said o f’ relation in the Categories, he pays 
attention only to the individual-species relation of the category of substance, and ignores the same 
sort of relation in other categories.
^It should be noted that “the particular thing (έκαστον)” in the passage must refer to substance, 
and Aristotle is talking only about SSP in which substantial predicates reveal what a substance is.
The idea o f the priority in definition deserves special attention. Some 
commentators argue that since others categories contain a substance’s definition in theirs, 
they must share a common element. Accordingly, Ferejohn argues that this is what the 
“focal meaning” should be,30and Bostock proposes that this implies an alteration of 
Aristotle’s earlier position.31 But this does not seem to me to be what the priority in 
definition implies. As mentioned earlier, for Aristotle, definition and names signify the 
same thing. Each category has its own essence-stating definition. When we define 
“white”, for instance, we say “White is a color”. Clearly, the definition o f substance does 
not occur here. Since substance is neither the genus o f any other category, nor the 
differentia, its presence does not seem to alter the distinct sense that each category’s 
genus + differentia explicates. Otherwise, we would again need a common significatum. 
Then, what does it mean to say that the definition o f substance is present in the definitions 
of other categories? Judged from the structure o f Meta. Z l, the primacy o f substance is 
mainly established on the ontological independence o f substance, and the three priorities are 
supposed to be a further specification o f that basic point. I am inclined to think that the 
presence o f substance in the definitions o f other categories is ontological rather than 
epistemological. It is present in other categories not because it is a part o f their formula of 
definition, but because a non-substance category cannot be separate from substance. The 
distinct sense o f ‘being’, on the other hand, is from SCP.
Z l itself presents a challenge to the sense-reduction interpretation. When Aristotle 
argues forcefully that substance is the primary sense o f being, he is aware that people 
might question the distinctness o f other beings:
So one might raise the question whether ‘to walk’ and ‘to be healthy’ and to ‘sit’ 
signify in  each case something that is, and similarly in any other case o f this sort 
(1028a20-22).
Z l does not deal with the issue directly. Nevertheless it maintains that “we know each of 
these predicates also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is” (1028b 1-2). 
That is, each non-substance category has its own “what it is”. Apparently, Aristotle 
himself does not believe that the primacy o f substance alters the “what it is” o f other 
categories.
Thus, SSP and SCP have different functions. While SCP indicates catégorial 
difference, SSP or the προς εν stands for a structure of ontological dependency. 
Aristotle’s view in this regard is remarkably consistent.
V. Beings: per se and per acciden 
SCP indicates that being has its own sense, as “being per se” (καθ’corro, usually 
translated as “in its own right”, Meta. Δ 7, 1017a23). Per se is in contrast to “per 
acciden” ( κατά συμβεβηκός, “accident” or “coincident”). SSP, on the other hand, indicates 
that every non-substance category is predicated o f substance and is accidental. Thus,
while all other predicates are not because they are accidental. For such a subject, what comes first 
must be the knowledge of substance radier than the knowledge of this thing’s quality or size, etc. 
However, to know what each non-substance category is in itself, we need to know each category’s 
own genus and differentiae. It is necessary to know what substance is, but it is not sufficient
30Ferejohn, ibid. 1981. His discussion is based on EE 1236al8-23.
3,Bostock, ibid. 1994. His is based on M?to.l028a34-6,1045b29-32
given SSP, how can a category still be a per se being? How can a being be both a per se 
being and an accidental being? This must be the concern behind the question at 
Zl,1028a20-22 (quoted above).
The term per se in A ristotle turns out to be one which itself “is said π ο λ λ α χ ώ ς” 
ln An. Po, 1,4, Aristotle lists four senses in which a thing can be said to be “per se”.32 Of 
which, the second sense (73a38-b4) is about the idion properties and the fourth (73bl0 - 
73b 16} is about a thing’s natural re su lt What interests us are the first and the third senses.
According to the first sense, one thing belongs to another per se “if  it belongs to 
it in what it is—e.g. line to triangle and point to line (for their substance depends on these 
and they belong in the account which says what they are)” (73a35-8). According to sense 
(i), X belongs per se to Y if  it is in Y’s  essence or definition. A species or genus is per se 
to its sub-level members, for it is in their definitions. Aristotle further believes that if X is 
per se Y, Y is also per se  X  {Meta A  1 8 ,1022a27-8).
The third sense is that, “Things which are not said o f an underlying subject I call 
things per se, and those which are said o f an underlying subject I call accidents” (73b4- 
10). X is per se i f  it is not said o f some other subject.
On the basis o f this classification o f the senses o f per se, it is clear that when 
Aristotle says there are as many categories as there are per se beings, and that different 
figures of predications signify different per se beings, he is adopting the first sense. We 
have argued that figures o f predication are the same with different forms o f SCP. In SCP 
a predicate as a species or genus reveals what the subject is, and provides a definition for 
the subject. Every SCP is a definitional statement, which accounts for catégorial 
difference, and explicates what a being is. A category is a generic element in any 
definition of its many-layers o f subordinate items, down to the particular. It holds true 
necessarily of all and only the members o f its type. A category is thus per se.
While SCP makes each being a being per se, the third sense o f per se specifies 
substance as the only being per se, and all non-substance beings as “accidental” to 
substance, on the grounds that w hile substance is predicated o f nothing further, “the 
things that do not signify a substance must be predicated o f some underlying subject”.33 
In the third sense, only substance is a  per se being, while other categories are accidental 
beings. This sense of per se explains precisely the picture that SSP presents. Every non­
substance category is predicated o f substance, while substance is n o t It is in this sense 
that the contrast between substance and non-substance categories becomes a contrast 
between per se being and per acciden being, or a contrast between being simpliciter and 
being something.34
Thus, if  we put Topics 1.9 and Cat. 4 together, put sense (1) and (3) together, the 
result is that, while substance is always a per se being, other categories are both per se 
beings [in sense (1)], and accidents [in sense (3)]. A non-substance category can both be 
per se and per acciden, relative to different senses of per se. Hence these two different 
roles are not contradictory. A non-substance category’s status as a per se being is not 
affected by the fact that it is predicated o f substance, for its perseity is achieved through
32 All of them are contained also in Meta. Δ18, which is an entry about the tom  “per se”.
B An. Po. 1,22, 83a32, cf. 83b25ff..
uAn.Po. 83b18-25,90al0ff; 5£. 167aIff; Meta. 1028a29-31,
its own significatum and its own genus + differentia definition, expressed by SCP. In the 
meantime, it is accidental to substance because it is predicated of the latter, as indicated 
by SSP. But SSP is not to determine what sense is, but to indicate the ontological 
relations o f beings of different natures.
To summarize what we have said so far, there is no real tension for Aristotle to 
say both that (a) being has many distinct senses and is not a genus, (b) all beings are 
related to substance and substance is the primary sense o f being. For (a) is a thesis about 
sense, while (b) is a thesis about the relations between categories. Indeed, it is in the 
combination o f these two aspects, the combination o f SCP and SSP that we understand 
why being is, in the strict sense, neither homonymous nor synonymous, but is a π ρ ό ς εν 
term. Because o f SCP, beings differ and each has its own definition; hence, each being 
has, as it were, its perseity. Thus, the term ‘being’ is not a strictly synonymous word. 
SSP, on the other hand, makes other beings accidental to substance by setting substance 
as subject to all non-substance categories. Because o f SSP, the term ‘being’ is different 
from such strictly homonymous term s as ‘bank’ (which signifies completely unrelated 
things such as “riverside” and “financial institution”). Thus, it is not right to believe that 
these two aspects belong to different stages o f A ristotle, or to explain them by appealing 
to some development hypothesis.
VI The science o f being
Now let us proceed to Owen’s other major claim  that the introduction o f the π ρ ό ς 
tv  enables Aristotle to found the universal science o f being qua being and to replace his 
earlier view that such a universal science is impossible. It is indisputable that Aristotle 
offered us two seemingly contradictory views regarding the possibility of a single universal 
science of being. At EE 1217b25-36 we read: “For ‘being’, as we have divided it in other 
works, signifies now what a thing is, now quality, now quantity, now time, and again some 
of it consiste in being changed and in changing;.. ..As then ‘being’ is not one in all that we 
have just mentioned, so neither is ‘good’; nor is there one science either of ‘being’ or o f the 
good”. This passage is sharply in contrast to the announcement o f Meta. Γ1 that “There is a 
science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue o f 
its own nature” (1003a23-4).
In Owen’s interpretation, these two views are really contradictory. The negative 
attitude belongs to Aristotle’s earlier thought when he was an anti-Platonist, whereas the 
positive attitude comes at Aristotle’s later stage which “looks more like a revival o f 
sympathy with Plato’s aims” 35 Owen’s reason for claiming this is that in his earlier 
works Aristotle only believes that ‘being’ is a strict homonym without any systematic 
connection in its different senses, whereas the “focal meaning” in Meta. Γ1-2 unifies 
them into a  systematic subject-matter, and thus makes a universal science possible.36
Now we have demonstrated that there is not an earlier stage in which Aristotle 
believes that being is a strict homonym, and that the προσ  ευ structure has been 
described in the Organon and other earlier works. There is no tension at all between the 
view that beings differ in different categories, and to say that being has a πρόσ  εν
35 Owen, ibid. 1960,164.
36 Fot Owen, “The inquiry described in Meta IV is not mentioned in the Organon, nor is it hidden 
in Aristotle’s sleeve” ( ibid. 1960,178).
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structure. According to this alternative account o f the πρόσ  εν, it is unlikely to be the 
case, as Owen claims, that the π ρ ό σ  εν is responsible for a change o f A ristotle’s view on 
the science o f being.
In place o f Owen’s interpretation, I would like to suggest that A ristotle’s different 
attitudes towards the science o f being result from the change o f his view o f what counts 
as a “science” (επιστήμη). This change, nonetheless, is an expansion o f the original view 
rather than a replacement.
In the Organon, EE, and som e other works, Aristotle claims that “a single science 
is one whose domain is a single genus”  (A nP o . 87a38, cf. 74b24-6; 76al 1-2. Let’s call it 
“the strict notion of science”). Now in  M eta .Y l where the stud}’ o f being whose subject- 
matter is the πρόσ  εν structured beings rather than a genus is called “science”. A 
justification is certainly in order. A ristotle explains: “Not only (où y a p  μόνον ) in the 
case of things which have one com m on notion does the investigation belong to one 
science, but also (ά λλα  και) in the case o f things which are said o f one nature (πρός 
μίαν...φύσιν) ” (1003M2-4). The “no t only...but also” structure o f this sentence suggests 
that there are two cases in which a science is possible The first half o f the sentence clearly 
refers to the strict notion o f science in  An. Po.. If all things must be within a genus, the 
name that applies to all o f them must be a synonym. Now Aristotle is saying that the word 
“science” applies “not only” to a study which is about a genus, “but also” to a study 
with a unified subject-matter based on the π ρ ό σ  εν structure. This passage sounds clearly 
like a defense for why the study o f being can be called “science”, and it is expanding the 
usage of the word “science”.37
When Aristotle announces the establishment o f the science o f being, he 
immediately says, “Now this is not the same as any o f the so-called special sciences; for 
none of these others deals generally w ith being as being. The}' cut o ff a part o f being and 
investigate the attribute of this part” (M eta .T l, 1003a23-25). The prevailing interpretation 
goes that Aristotle here is drawing a line between metaphysics and (natural) sciences in 
terms of universality and particularity. Yet precisely what their relation is has been 
subjected to various interpretations, depending on how one’s own understanding o f what 
the relationship between philosophy and natural science should be. I would like to 
propose that the real issue is a contrast between different notions o f sciences rather than a 
contrast between the universal and the particular. According to the strict notion o f 
science, all sciences have to be special or departmental, for they are concerned with a 
genus. It has never been their job to study being in general. Beyond the special genus is 
toe field of dialectic. To declare the establishm ent o f a universal science o f being in Meta. 
Γ affects nothing at all for such a situation. When Aristotle compares this science of 
being with other sciences, he is actually emphasizing toe fact that, whereas all toe 
sciences are concerned with a single genus, this study is not. Since being concerned with 
a genus has been one basic condition for a discipline to meet in order to be called a 
“science”, this immediate comparison A ristotle is making serves to remind his audience 
that the condition is no longer necessary. The two notions mentioned shortly afterward at 
1003M2-4 echo this comparison and give it an explanation.
37See note.25.
16
In A ristotle’s rigid notion, a science must satisfy two conditions. In addition to 
being concerned with one genus, it must be demonstrative. Modeled on mathematics and 
especially on geometry, Aristotle claims that a science should start from a small set o f 
axiomatic first principles which are self-evident (e.g. Top. 100a30-b21; An Po.76b23-4), 
and grasped by nous ( “intellect”, e.g. 1005b5-17; EN  1140b31-1141a8; 1143a35-b3), and 
thaï proceed to a laige set o f theorems by deduction. The two conditions in the rigid notion 
o f science are connected. For demonstration can only be conducted within a genus, and 
cannot pass from one genus to another "Nor can the theorem of any one science be 
demonstrated by means o f another science, unless these theorems are related as subordinate 
to superior” (An.Po. 75b8-16, cf. also 76a21-22; SE  172a36-8).
If being is not within a genus, the study o f it cannot be demonstrative. Hence, when 
Aristotle claims that the study o f being can also be called “science”, he not only looses 
the requirement that a science must be about a genus, but he also no longer insists that a 
science has to be demonstrative: “There is no demonstration o f substance and essence, 
but some other way o f revealing it” {Meta. E l, 1025M 4-15, cf. also, B2,997a26-32; Γ4, 
1006a5-ll). The science o f being is not dem onstrative.38
Accordingly, we are inclined to think that Aristotle denies the possibility o f a 
universal science of bang in his earlier works because he sticks to his rigid notion o f 
science in An.Po that a science has to be a demonstrative, departmental discipline. Now in 
M etaT  the study o f being can be called “science”, not because this discipline satisfies the 
two conditions o f the rigid notion o f science, but because Aristotle departs from that 
notion. A study does not have to be about a genus and demonstrative in order to be called 
“science”. It is the conception of science that is at issue.
Consequential to our view that the ττρόσ εν o f being is in the earlier works, a 
study o f it should have been there as well, although it m ight not be called “science”. This 
indeed seems to be the case. When Aristode holds only the rigid notion of science, he 
does not deny that there is a study or discipline which covers more than one genus or deals 
with inter-category issues. He only claims that such a study cannot be called “science”; he 
calls it “dialectic” instead. Dialectic, according to Aristode, is not concerned with a genus, 
and is not demonstrative. It deals with the material that is common to or relevant to all the 
departmental sciences and all fields o f discourse, and is therefore a universal study 
{AnPo. 77a26-31 ; SE  172al 1-15; Topics. 101a36-b4; Rhetoric 1355b8). This description
n  Although Aristotle denies the methodology of the science of being to be demonstrative, he never 
offers a positive and explicit account of what its methodology is. In his defence of the principle of 
non-contradiction, Aristode’s argument is that although no positive demonstration is possible, its 
truth can be shown on the grounds that no one can reasonably reject it (1006a5-l 1-15; 1008bl0-12). 
Irwin argues that the defence of PNC is “the model of argument in first philosophy” ( “Aristotle’s 
Discovery of Metaphysics”, Review o f Metaphysics, 1977, 223) and names it “strong dialectic” ( 
Aristotle’s First Principles, Oxford, 1988, 175). Yet, most discussion we find in the Metaphysics 
does not have such a qualky, and it is not convincing to say that the defence of PNC exemplifies a 
universal methodology that Aristotle believes that first philosophy should have. Indeed Robert 
Bolton points out that even in the proof of PNC Aristotle’s argument is characteristic of peirastic 
elenehus, as described in SE ( “Aristotle’s Conception of Metaphysics as a Science”, in Scaltsas, 
Charles and Gill (eds.). Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle 's Metaphysics, Oxford, 1994, 
321-354.
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of dialectic’s subject-matter sounds very similar to that o f the science o f being. As a 
matter of fact, Γ2 explicitly claims that philosophy and dialectic have the same subject 
matter, “Dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all 
things (Γ2, 1004bl9-20); and, “D ialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to 
know” (ibid. b25-6). The fields that dialectic and the science of being are concerned with 
are indeed mostly overlapping. W hile the science o f being concerns all beings with 
substance as the common subject, th is structure has been presented in the Organon. 
While the science of being deals w ith the first principles o f deduction (1005b7), dialectic 
is said to be concerned with “common rules in the refutation and deduction” (SE  170a35; 
Rhetoric 1358a2-32). While the science o f being discusses the contrary terms such as 
same and other, like and unlike, prior and posterior, etc. (M eta.r2.1004b30-4, 1005al5- 
16), these are already subjects o f dialectic (Meta. B l, 995b 18-25). At M etaT 1004a31 -b4, 
he even says that if to investigate all these things is not the job of the philosopher, whose 
is it? Since he has already said that they are in the field o f the dialecticians, we have 
reason to believe that it is the field o f dialectic that is taken over by the philosopher. The 
scope o f the science o f being is expressed in a more systematic and refined way in 
Meta.T, but its basic framework, blocks, and timbers are already in the earlier works.
Γ 2, 1004M9-20 suggests that what distinguishes dialectic from the science o f 
being is not the subject-matter, but their respective goals. For whereas dialectic is critical, 
philosophy is after positive knowledge. Even this distinction, however, has to be 
qualified. Dialectic has different senses and functions in the Organon.39 40It is described as 
critical, examining, testing (SE 170a20-bll, 172al7-b4) and even “destructive” (EE, 
1217M6), but it is also described to be “in the spirit o f inquiry” (Topics, 159a25-37), 
leading to the discovery o f truth: “For dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the 
path to the principles o f all inquiries” (101b 3-4). There is no doubt, for instance, that the 
discussions in Topics 1.9 and Cat. 1-5 are not merely critical, but are also, as the science 
o f being, about “how thing are” (M eta. 1030a27-b7). The notion o f dialectic which is in 
contrast to the science o f being m ust only mean dialectic in its negative sense. The 
science of being, despite its overwhelming name, and various mysteries that the tradition 
has attached to it, turns out to be the successor to the positive dialectic o f the Organon.49
39Cf. C. Kirwan, ibid. 1993,84-5.
40 It is interesting to notice that at one place this seems to be what Owen himself believes when he 
says that “the new science is not an axiomatic system; and lest it seem curiously like those non- 
departmental inquiries which Aristotle had previously dubbed ‘dialectical’ or ‘logical’ and branded 
as unscientific, dialectic is quietly demoted to one department of its old province so as to leave 
room for the new giant*’ (ibid. 1966, 146).
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